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Intellectual Property
by Laurence P. Colton*
Nigamnarayan Acharya*"
and Michael J. Bootcheck***
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law developments in the area of intellectual
property, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks, relevant to
Georgia during the period from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004.
The authors have not attempted to include all cases that touch upon
intellectual property, but instead have selected decisions that are of
more significance or interest or that may indicate a particular direction

in the areas of law. While the cited cases often have multiple issues, the
authors have reported only on the more relevant or interesting issues.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual property law are
patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade secret law.'
Because patent law and copyright law are provided for in the United
States Constitution,2 these cases are based on federal law. Trademark

* Principal of the law firm of Technoprop Colton L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts
University (B.S. Ch.E, 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
** Associate in the law firm of Technoprop Colton L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Wisconsin-Madison (B.S. in Biochemistry, Molecular Biology, and Political Science,
1998); Emory University (J.D., 2001). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Registered to
practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
*** Associate in the law firm of Technoprop Colton L.L.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Purdue
University (B.S. Civil Engineering, 1994); University of Florida (M.E., 1996; J.D., 1999).
Member, State Bar of Florida. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
1. Secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article include trade dress and
know-how.
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "The
Congress shall have Power... (8) To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
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law and trade secret law have both federal' and state aspects, and the
cases regarding these areas are based on federal or state law. However,
the more interesting cases are litigated in the United States federal
courts. As such, this Article will focus on cases selected from the federal
courts with precedent in Georgia courts.
II.

PATENT CASES

A.

Claim Construction
The claims of a patent are the equivalent of the metes and bounds of
the patent-the scope of coverage or protection of the patent. Claims are
construed using a number of factors, and the terms within a claim are
given their ordinary meaning in the field of the invention or the art
unless the patent applicant, through the patent or the prosecution
history of the patent application in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO"), chooses to be his own lexicographer.4
Because the scope of a claim often can be determinative in a patent
infringement action, many cases in the field of patent law are often
appealed on the issue of claim construction-what the terms of the
claims mean or protect.
For example, in Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,' the Federal Circuit'
held that, although the term "consisting of"7 in a claim limits the

claimed invention, it does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention.8
Norian Corp. ("Norian") alleged that Stryker Corp.'s ("Stryker")
BoneSource@ kit, which had a sodium phosphate element, a mixture of
tetracalcium phosphate element, and instructions for using the kit and

Writings and Discoveries .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Authors/Writings refers to
copyright, and Inventors/Discoveries refers to patent.
3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation, and provides that "[tihe Congress shall have power ... (3) [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
.... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. The writer of a patent application can define or redefine terms at will, and thus, can
be their own lexicographer. As long as a term is defined in a patent application, that
definition generally will prevail, even if different than the ordinary meaning of the term.
5. 363 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
6. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals hears all appeals from patent cases decided in
all of the United States District Courts.
7. "Comprising," "consisting of," and "consisting essentially of' are terms of art in
patent claims, varying from most open ended to least open ended in scope of coverage,
respectively.
8. 363 F.3d at 1331.
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a spatula, infringed on the claims of the patents-in-suit. The claim 9 in
the relevant patent claimed it contained a kit "consisting of"' ° at least
one calcium source, at least one phosphoric acid source free of uncombined water, and a solution consisting of water and a sodium phosphate. 1 Stryker argued that the inclusion of the spatula rendered the
kit outside the scope of the claims.' 2 The court determined that the
spatula was not part of the invention because the term "kit" only limited
the specified chemicals and, as such, Stryker infringed the claims."3
In Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,14 the Federal Circuit held
that claims may be construed as used by the patentee even if the result
is nonsensical."8 The only issue on appeal in this case was whether the
claim limitation "'heating the resulting batter-coated dough to a
temperature in the range of about 400oF to 850oF"' specified the
temperature at which the dough was to be heated (i.e., the temperature
of the oven), or to which the dough itself was to be heated, meaning the
batter would be burned to a crisp.' 6 Interestingly, the court concluded
that the patentee's use of the term "at" in specific instances in the
specification (e.g., in examples) and the term "to" in the claims showed17
that the patentee intentionally used the term "to" rather than "at."
As such, the court held that the terms must be given the meanings used
by the patentee and not those redrafted in later documents, irrespective
of an unusable product or a nonsensical result. 8
In Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.," the Federal Circuit
held that the claims were restricted by the patent specification and

9. Claim 8 read as follows:
A kit for preparing a calcium phosphate mineral, said kit consisting of: at least
one calcium source and at least one phosphoric acid source free of uncombined
water as dry ingredients; and a solution consisting of water and a sodium
phosphate, where the concentration of said sodium phosphate in said water ranges
from 0.01 to 2.0 M and said solution has a pH in the range of about 6 to 11.
Id. at 1324-25.
10. Id. at 1331. The lower district court held as a matter of law that the term
"consisting of" covered a kit that could include nothing more than the elements claimed
and that Stryker Corp.'s kit could not infringe because the spatula was an extra element.
Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1332.
14. 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 1375.
16. Id. at 1372-73 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 1374.
18. Id.
19. 357 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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remarks made during the prosecution of the patent. 20 The patent
holder, Multi-Tech Systems, Inc. ("Multi-Tech"), stipulated at the
Markman hearing2 that no infringement existed literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents, under a claim construction in which an allegedly
infringing network system conducted transmission through a packetswitched network, as opposed to a standard telephone line. Only the
claims in one of the three patents-in-suit explicitly stated that the
transmission of data packets between a local site and a remote site must
22
occur over a telephone line, and only the "Summary of the Invention"
defined the invention narrowly for use over telephone lines. Further,
Multi-Tech made a statement during the prosecution of one of the
patents-in-suit, which occurred after the first of the three patents issued,
defining the communication protocol for the patented invention as over
the telephone lines. 23 As a result, the patent disclaimed the use of a
packet-switched network, and therefore, use of a packet-switched
network did not infringe the patents-in-law suit.24
In Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchostarSatellite Corp.,25 the Federal Circuit
held that absent an accepted meaning in the art, a court must define a
claim term only as broadly as provided for in the patent itself.2" Irdeto
Access, Inc. ("Irdeto") patented a system for "controlling the broadcast
of digital information signals by using three layers or tiers of complementary encryption and decryption keys-'service keys,' 'group keys,' and
'box keys."'2 7 Irdeto defined several words in its patent specification
that had no meaning in the art and explicitly argued to the USPTO
examiner that it could be its own lexicographer. Echostar Satellite Corp.
("Echostar") argued that it did not infringe the claims because the term
"group," as defined by Irdeto, was something less than all members and
Echostar's device applied to all members.2" Irdeto countered that
"group" had a broader ordinary meaning and that, absent a "clear
disclaimer" or words of "manifest exclusion," the heavy presumption of
ordinary meaning must apply.29 Specifically, Irdeto argued that "'[a]

20. Id. at 1347.
21. A Markman hearing is a pre-trial hearing at which the scope of the patent claim
is determined for purposes of the trial.
22. A "Summary of the Invention" is a section of the patent specification common to all
of the patents. Microsoft, 357 F.3d at 1345.
23. Id. at 1348.
24. Id.
25. 383 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
26. Id. at 1303.
27. Id. at 1296.
28. Id. at 1298-99.
29. Id. at 1300.
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group may be as small as a single individual or it may be substantially
larger."° The court stated that the burden of a precise definition falls
on the applicant and that when there is no meaning for a term in the art
a court will construe and limit a claim by its definition in the specification."' Thus, the Federal Circuit held Irdeto to the more limited
definition of "group" as defined in the specification.32
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.," the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of non-infringement. 4 In
this suit, C.R. Bard, Inc. ("Bard") asserted patent infringement against
United States Surgical Corp., based on a patent for a device to repair
hernias. The dispute related to whether proper claim construction
required an infringing device to have "pleats" even though the claim did
not specifically include the term "pleats." 5 Relying on Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. ,36 Bard argued that dictionary definitions should override or trump the intrinsic record. 7 The court noted
that the "Summary of the Invention" section of the patent stated "'[tihe
present invention is an implantable prosthesis ... [that] includes a
Further, the "Abstract" section of the patent
pleated surface.' ' 3 8
described "'[a]n implantable prosthesis including a conical mesh plug
having a pleated surface which conforms to the contours of the defect
being repaired."' 39 The court also noted that a review of the prosecution history and a re-examination of the patent indicated that Bard

30. Id. at 1298 (quoting amended claim 1).
31. Id. at 1300.
32. Id.
33. 388 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
34. Id. at 870.
35. Id. at 859-60. Claim 20, the claim at issue, stated:
An implantable prosthesis for repairing a tissue or muscle wall defect, comprising:
a hollow plug, formed of a surgical mesh fabric having openings therein for tissue
ingrowth, constructed and arranged to securely fit within and occlude the tissue
or muscle wall defect and which is radially compressible upon insertion into the
defect from a first configuration which is larger than the defect into a second
configuration which approximates the shape of the defect, the surface of said
hollow plug being conformable to irregularities in the tissue or muscle wall
defining the defect upon insertion of said hollow plug into the defect, said hollow
plug being extremely pliable, allowing localized portions of the hollow plug to adapt
to irregularities in the tissue or muscle wall defect.

Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Bard, 388 F.3d at 862.
Id. at 864 (quoting '432 Patent, col. 1, 11.36).
Id. (quoting the patent Abstract).
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distinguished its device over the prior art because its device had
pleats.4 °
4 the Federal Circuit affirmed the USPTO Board of
In In re Crish,"
Patent Appeals and Interferences 42 and the examiner's rejection of a
patent application's claims on anticipation grounds.4 3 At issue in the
case were claims that included two "transition" terms--"comprising" and
"consists."" The court stated that "it is well-established that 'comprising' is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named
elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form
a construct within the scope of the claim."45 Regarding the context of
the claims, the court noted that although the claims included the closedended transition term "contains," the claims were not precluded from
covering additional nucleotides because the open-ended transition term
"comprising" was also included in the claims relative to nucleotides. 6
In Honeywell International,Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,47 the
Federal Circuit held that
the fact that the scope of the rewritten claim has remained unchanged
will not preclude the application of prosecution history estoppel if, by

canceling the original independent claim and rewriting the dependent
claims into independent form, the scope of subject matter claimed
48 in
the independent claim has been narrowed to secure the patent.

40. Id. at 867-68.
41. 393 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
42. The USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) hears, among other
things, appeals of USPTO examiners' final rejections of patent applications.
43. In re Crish, 393 F.3d at 1260. Anticipation is when the USPTO determines that
a claimed invention is not new or novel and, therefore, not subject to patent protection.
44. Id. at 1255-56. See, e.g., Claim 53, which states "[a] purified oligonucleotide
comprising at least a portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1, wherein said
portion consists of the nucleotide sequence from 521 to 2473 of SEQ ID NO: 1, and wherein
said portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 has promoter activity." Id. at
1254.
45. Id. at 1257 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
46. Id.
47. 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 1142. See also Keith v. Charles E. Hires Co., 116 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1940). In
Keith Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, stated:
We can see no difference between that situation [where the claim was amended
to secure allowance] and one where as here the applicant files a limited and a
broader claim at the same time and then cancels the broader one when it has been
rejected. The theory of the "estoppel," as it is called is that, by assenting to the
cancellation of the claim and by amending it, the applicant has abandoned it as
it stood. Certainly it cannot be necessary to this conclusion that he shall amend
the cancelled claim, when he has already filed a claim which contains the
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Specifically, a patent applicant is deemed to have "surrendered" aspects
of the patent coverage when claims are amended during the patent
application prosecution; the surrendered subject matter is "defined by
the cancellation of independent claims that do not include a particular
limitation and the rewriting into independent form of dependent claims
that do include that limitation."49 Judge Newman dissented and noted
that the court held the act of restating a dependent claim in independent
form as a "narrowing amendment" in terms of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., ° even though the claim was never
rejected or otherwise amended. 5 ' Thus, the court advanced a farreaching, new rule that an element or limitation contained in a
dependent claim, although never narrowed and never subjected to any
ground of rejection, has presumptively surrendered all equivalents if the
dependent claim is rewritten in independent form.5 2 This case has the
potential to significantly limit the scope of protection on all patent
claims-past, present, and future. It will be interesting to see how later
courts interpret this case.
B.

Doctrine of Equivalents

Even if a potential infringer does not infringe the literal limitations of
a claim, the potential infringer can still infringe upon the scope of a
patent and its claims through the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine
of equivalents recognizes that claim language is imperfect and grants a
patent claim a certain range of equivalents of the structures or steps in
the claim. Although the scope of equivalents is determined by a number
of factors and principles, the prosecution history 3 of a patent has a
crucial role in the ultimate scope of equivalents.

necessary differentia.
Id. at 48.
49. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1144. "Independent" claims are claims that can stand alone.
"Dependent" claims are claims that depend or rely on other claims, generally by adding
method steps or device features.
50. 234 F.3d 558, 574 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("Festo I"). See Laurence P. Colton &
Nigamarayan Acharya, Intellectual Property, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1473 (2001), 54 MERCER
L. REV. 1601 (2002), and 55 MERCER L. REV. 1327 (2003) for discussions of this seminal
case.
51. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1146 (Newman, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 1148 (Newman, J., dissenting).
53. The prosecution history is the written record of the give and take between the
applicant and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during the patent
application stage.
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In PSC Computer Products, Inc. v.Foxconn International,Inc.,"' the
Federal Circuit held that a patent holder cannot reclaim a matter
disclosed but not claimed in the specification of a patent under the
doctrine of equivalents.5 5 Defendant was a competitor selling plastic
retainer clips that plaintiff alleged fell within the bounds of the patent
claims under the doctrine of equivalents. Although the patent specification stated that prior art devices used plastic parts, the patent did not
claim plastic parts but instead included an explicit metal limitation.5"
The court determined that the patent holder had dedicated plastic clips
to the public because the patent's written description disclosed clips
made of plastic parts, without claiming clips made from plastic, and that
the patent holder could not recapture the plastic clips through the
doctrine of equivalents.5" This rule is often referred to by courts and
patent attorneys as the "disclosure-dedication rule." 5
In reaching its decision in PSC, the court appeared to be concerned
with the notice function of patents-the function of patents is to provide
notice to the public of the matter within the scope of the invention.59
Specifically, the court noted that the written description provides notice
on the subject matter of the patent and the claims provide notice on the
scope of protection for the invention.6" Someone of ordinary skill in the
art (patent law's equivalent of the reasonable person) should be able to
read a patent, discern which subject matter is disclosed and discussed
in the written description, and recognize which matter has been
claimed.6 1 Accordingly, the court held that the patentee may not first
dedicate (by disclosing and not claiming) the plastic retaining clip to the
public and later attempt to reclaim it using the doctrine of equivalents. 2
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.Excel Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,63 the
Federal Circuit held that the doctrine of equivalents may be applied to
capture an "unforeseeable" equivalent. 64 During the prosecution of the

54. 355 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 1360.
56. Id. at 1355.
57. Id. at 1356, 1358.
58. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
59. PSC, 355 F.3d at 1359.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1360.
62. Id. at 1360-61.
63. 356 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004). SmithKline Beecham Corp. is currently known as
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc.
64. Id. at 1365.
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patent-in-suit, SmithKline Beecham Corp. ("SmithKline") amended
various claims to recite the use of hydroxypropyl methylcellulose
("HPMC") as a sustained release mechanism for bupropion to address
the USPTO examiner's lack of enablement rejection, which triggered the
presumption that the patentee surrendered the scope between the
original claims and the amended claims.65 Because the record did not
address whether other sustained release mechanisms, such as Excel
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'s ("Excel") proposed sustained release mechanism
using polyvinyl alcohol ("PVA"), were foreseeable, the court held the use
of PVA could be an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents if PVA
was found to be an "unforeseeable" technology."
In Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,6 the Federal
Circuit held that "intent" is not a part of the disclosure-dedication
analysis,6 8 and the disclosure-dedication rule does not impose a 35
U.S.C. § 11269 requirement on the disclosed but unclaimed subject
matter.7 ° White Consolidated Industries, Inc. ("White") moved for
summary judgment under the doctrine of equivalents against infringement claims on Toro Co.'s ("Toro") patent for a hand-held machine
primarily used to vacuum or blow leaves and other lawn debris. White
contended that Toro disclosed, but did not claim, the "equivalent" in
question, namely, that Toro disclosed a cover with a replaceable ring
structure but only claimed a cover with an affixed ring structure. Toro
argued that (1) it did not intentionally decline to claim or deliberately
leave unclaimed any disclosure of the replaceable ring structure of
White's device; and (2) the disclosure in the application, if any, of such
structure was insufficient under § 112. White argued that (1) intent did
not matter under the disclosure-dedication rule; (2) the disclosurededication rule applies only to claims for subject matter; and (3) there
were no genuine issues of fact, and thus, summary judgment was

65. Id. at 1361-62.
66. Id. at 1365.
67. 383 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
68. Id. at 1333. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc., 285 F.3d at 1052 (stating that
disclosure in the specification without claiming dedicates unclaimed subject matter to the
public).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). In relevant part, a § 112 requirement is that
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
70. Toro, 383 F.3d at 1334.
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proper. 7' The court agreed with White on all three counts and affirmed
the decision.72
In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.,7 the
Federal Circuit held that a rebuttal of "the Festo presumption that a
narrowing amendment made for a reason of patentability surrenders the
entire territory between the original claim limitation and the amended
claim limitation" is valid when the narrowing amendment "bears 'no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.'"v" The
court held a process claim that originally covered multiple vacuum cups,
but subsequently was narrowed to a single cup, was only tangentially
related to an equivalent process and, applying the doctrine of equivalents, was not barred.75 In this instance, the claim was amended
during the prosecution of the patent application to avoid prior art that
dictated the placement of the cups and were not amended to avoid the
quantity of cups.76 Therefore, a competitor's use of multiple cups
infringed the patented claims through application of the doctrine of
equivalents.7 7
C.

Patent Invalidity

Patent invalidity is a powerful counterclaim or defense to patent
infringement. A patent may be invalid for numerous technical and
substantive reasons. During this survey period, the Federal Circuit
decided an interesting case upholding the validity of a patent that was
at issue.
In High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime
Co.,7" the Federal Circuit held that invalidation of a patent pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 1127' requires that "(1) the inventor knew of a better
mode than was disclosed, and (2) the inventor concealed that better
mode."" Further, "[tihe best mode requirement of § 112 is not violated

71. Id. at 1330-33.
72. Id. at 1337.
73. 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
74. Id. at 1368 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) ("Festo II)).
75. Id. at 1365, 1370.
76. Id. at 1365.
77. Id. at 1370-71.
78. 377 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Section 112 requires that a patent "set forth the best mode
[of the invention] contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention" at the time
the patent is filed. Id.
80. High Concrete, 377 F.3d at 1382 (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913
F.2d 923, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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by unintentional omission of information that would be readily known
to persons in the field of the invention."8' Here, there was neither
evidence nor an inference that the inventors concealed a better mode.8 2
Thus, the court held there was no violation of § 112 and the validity of
the patent was upheld. 3
D. ProceduralIssues
Aside from substantive issues of patent law, the Federal Circuit has
resolved several procedural issues that directly affect patent enforcement. Often the Federal Circuit reports precedents in patent cases that
bind district courts throughout the country on procedural issues.
In Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 4 the Federal Circuit held that
federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over a case between a
licensee and a patent holder in good standing.85 Gen-Probe, Inc. ("GenProbe"), the licensee, paid royalty payments to the patent holder,
exercised its right under the license to sublicense, and was otherwise in
good standing under the license. Gen-Probe filed a declaratory judgment
action alleging, inter alia, that it did not infringe the licensed patent and
that the patent was invalid. 86 The court held that no case or controversy exists under the Lear doctrine 7 until the licensee "'actually ceases
payment of royalties, and [I provides notice to the licensor that the
reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed the
relevant claims to be invalid."' 8 In this case, because the licensee was
in good standing, there was no case or controversy under which the
federal courts could exercise jurisdiction. 9 Further, the court noted
that from a policy standpoint, allowing this action to proceed would
effectively discourage patentees from granting licenses because the
"licensor would bear all the risk, while [the] licensee would benefit from
the license's effective cap on damages or royalties in the event [the
licensee's] challenge to the patent's scope or validity fails."90

81. Id. at 1383.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1384.
84. 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
85. Id. at 1377, 1381.
86. Id. at 1378.
87. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,673-74 (1969) (explaining that a license does not
alone bar the licensee from challenging the validity of a patent).
88. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Shell Oil
Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
89. Id. at 1382.
90. Id.
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Exceptional Cases

Section 285 of the Patent Act 9 provides that a court, in "exceptional"
cases, may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.9 2
Pursuant to the statute, courts have repeatedly identified only those
cases involving inequitable conduct before the USPTO, such as litigation
misconduct, bad faith litigation, frivolous lawsuits, or willful infringement, as exceptional. Whether a case is exceptional is determined on a
case-by-case basis.
In Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 3 the Federal Circuit
concluded that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") willfully infringed a
patent and awarded a reasonable royalty and attorney fees under
§ 285.94 Defendant Wal-Mart sold an imported, portable, wireless,
remote-controlled search light that was allegedly a low-end copy of a
patented design, identical in all respects except for the apparently
arbitrary placement of a plastic stop that prevented the infringing
search light from rotating through 360 degrees.95 The court rejected
defendant's argument that the claims were limited to a light that rotated
360 degrees as shown in the specification embodiment. 96 After determining that defendant infringed the patent, the court ruled that the
infringement was willful because defendant did not take any appropriate
action after the patent holder notified defendant of the possible
infringement. 97 Because of the exceptional nature of the case, the court
upheld both the royalty determination of thirty-one dollars per unit,
which was reasonable as representing fifty percent of the profits, and the
award of attorney fees because defendant's infringement was willful
after notification.98
In Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,"
the Federal Circuit held that "[a]n adverse inference that a legal opinion
[on patent infringement] was or would have been unfavorable shall not
be drawn from invocation of the attorney-client and/or work product
privileges or from failure to consult with counsel."' 00 The court noted

91. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
92. Id.
93. 355 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
94. Id. at 1340.
95. Id. at 1329.
96. Id. at 1331-32.
97. Id. at 1339.
98. Id. at 1338-39.
99. 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
100. Id. at 1347. Patent attorneys often provide opinions on whether a client's
invention may or may not infringe a patent. Such infringement opinion letters are
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that although stare decisis always requires "special justification," the
force of the "conceptual underpinnings" of this precedent have significantly diminished. 1 ' This determination supplies the justification
that "[the adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or produce an
exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted" and that
"[p]recedent authorizing such inference is overruled." 2 The court
further noted that if the attorney-client privilege, or the work-product
privilege, or both is invoked by a defendant in an infringement action,
the trier of fact may not draw an adverse inference with respect to
willful infringement.' 3 Finally, the court held that it is also inappropriate to draw an adverse inference regarding willful infringement from
the defendant's failure to obtain legal advice.' 4
F

ContributoryInfringement

Contributory or induced infringement is the act of selling or supplying
an item for which the only or predominant use is in connection with a
patented invention.'1 5 In a case of alleged induced patent infringement, the patent holder must show that the alleged contributory
infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should
have known his actions would induce actual infringement.0 6 Absent
direct infringement of the claims of a patent, there can be neither
contributory infringement nor induced infringement.0 7
In Jacobs v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,'' the Federal Circuit held
that there was no contributory infringement because the patentee's
license carried an implied license to consumers to use the end prodAs a result of previous litigation, the patentee, Jacobs, gave
uct.'
Analog Devices, Inc. ("Analog Devices") an irrevocable, perpetual, fully
paid license to practice his patent,"0 which was directed to a "Tilt

attorney work product and subject to the attorney-client privilege.
101. Id. at 1343-44 (citing Arizona v. Sumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
102. Id. at 1344.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1345.
105. See Jacobs v. Nintendo of America, 370 F.3d 1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 370 F.3d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
109. Id. at 1101-02.
110. The contract stated:
Clause 3: License. Jacobs grants Analog an irrevocable, perpetual, fully paid up
license to take any actions set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271 which would, but for this
license, constitute an infringement or violation of Jacobs' patent rights under the
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Sensitive Non-Joystick Control Box," which could be used with video
games."' Jacobs filed a patent infringement action against Nintendo
of America, Inc. ("Nintendo"), alleging Nintendo produced a control box
that used licensed material purchased from Analog Devices, which
infringed the patent because Nintendo did not have a license from Jacob
under his patent. 112 The court held that Analog Devices' license
inherently provided a license to consumers, and Nintendo must have an
implied license to practice the invention because, without such an
implied license, Analog Devices' license would be worthless and would
violate basic contract principles."3 This case verifies the general rule
that once a patentee is paid for a patented item, his rights to further
payments upon further transfers of that item ends.
G.

Written Description

In 2004 the Federal Circuit decided several cases relating to the
written description of subject invention using the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 112."' The written description provision requires an applicant to convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as
of the filing date sought, she was in possession of the invention, and the
invention, in that context, is the item now claimed in the patent
application. "' The following cases provide a snapshot of the Federal
Circuit's current philosophy concerning adequate, and inadequate,
written descriptions.
In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.," 6 the Federal Circuit held that
the patent-in-suit could not claim priority on prior patent applications
by merely disclosing nonexistent, nonenabled technology." 7 Chiron

'958 patent. Without limiting the foregoing, the license granted hereunder includes
the right to make, use, sell, import and export components, including micromachined accelerometers, for use in tilt-sensitive control boxes.
Clause 5: Covenant-not-to-sue. Jacobs covenants not to sue Analog for any alleged
infringement or violation of the '958 patent. This covenant-not-to-sue extends to
any cause of action having as an element the infringement of the '958 patent by
Analog or any other party, whether occurring in the past, present, or in the future.
Id. at 1098-99.
111. Id. at 1099.
112. Id. at 1099-1100.
113. Id. at 1101.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
115. Id.
116. 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 1253. Under 35 U.S.C. § 120,
[an application for patent for an invention ...,which is filed by an inventor or
inventors named in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as
to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed
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Corp.'s ("Chiron") patent-in-suit, which claimed priority on a series of
prior applications filed in 1984, 1985, and 1986, was directed to
monoclonal antibodies." 8 However, the court concluded that the
patent-in-suit did not disclose enough details to practice the technology
and that it was not adequately supported by the prior application series
because genetically engineered antibodies, specifically chimeric
antibodies, only first appeared as a successful technology in the
literature of this art field in May 1984, four months after the February
1984 filing date of the first application."1 9 Specifically, because
antibody technology was in its nascent stage, one of ordinary skill could
not practice the invention in the prior application series without undue
experimentation, particularly because the technology was not yet
available. 2 ' Accordingly, the patent-in-suit lacked priority and was held
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102121 as being disclosed by an intervening
prior art.' 22
In University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,'2 ' the Federal
Circuit held that a patent for a method that does not disclose the
necessary specific compounds suitable for use with the method provides
inadequate written disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112.124 University of

before the patenting of abandonment of or the termination of proceedings on the
first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing
date of the first application and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific
reference to the earlier filed application.
35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000 & Supp. 2002). In this way, a series of patent applications on
related inventions can be filed, all of which may have a priority filing date of the very first
patent application filed on the series of inventions.
118. A monoclonal antibody is a composition with a homogeneous antibody population.
Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1249-50.
119. Id. at 1254-55.
120. Id. at 1255-56. Factual considerations with regard to undue experimentation
include:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or
guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the
nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth
of the claims.
Id. (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
122. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1252-53 (the parties stipulated that the patent-in-suit was
invalid without priority). Intervening prior art would include such things as patents and
other publications that became public in the time period between the filing date of the first
patent application in the series and the filing date of the patent application for the patentin-suit. Id. at 1253-54.
123. 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
124. Id. at 930.
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Rochester obtained a patent for a method of enzyme inhibition (prostaglandin H synthase-2) by administration of a non-steroidal compound
but did not disclose any such compound, provide any means of identifying such a compound, or indicate that the University in fact knew of
such a compound. 2 ' The court held that, even if the patent language
enabled one skilled in the art to determine a subject compound by
experimentation, satisfaction of the enablement requirement 126 did not
satisfy the written description requirement, and the failure to identify
a required compound rendered the patent invalid for lack of adequate
description. 127 Although the adequacy of the written description is
ordinarily a question of fact, the court noted that evidence rebutting the
presumptive validity of the patent was not required in this case because
the inadequacy was apparent on the face of the patent.'28
In In re Wallach,'2 9 the Federal Circuit held that the written
description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 was not satisfied when
the amino acid structures could not be determined because no amino
acid sequence, or partial sequence, was provided. 3 ° Applicants' patent
application was directed to two binding proteins that selectively
inhibited the cytotoxic effect of tumor necrosis factor. Appellants
obtained a partial amino acid sequence of the N-terminal portion of the
second of these proteins, and they determined that the complete protein
had a molecular weight of about thirty kilodaltons when measured by
sodium dodecyl sulfate polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis under
reducing conditions. Appellants' patent application included, inter alia,
claims directed to proteins having that molecular weight and partial
sequence and having the ability to inhibit the cytotoxic effect of tumor
necrosis factor.' 3' The court relied on an earlier decision that
the written description requirement can be met by "show[ing] that an
invention is complete by disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant
identifying characteristics... i.e., complete or partial structure, other
physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristicswhen

125. Id. at 918-20.
126. Id. at 923. Section 112, inter alia, requires that the specification of a patent shall
contain a written description of the manner and process of making and using it (i.e., the
invention) in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
127. Rochester, 358 F.3d at 927.
128. Id. at 930.
129. 378 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
130. Wallach, 378 F.3d at 1335.
131. Id. at 1331.
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and
coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between1 function
2

structure, or some combination of such characteristics."

The court noted that Wallach had been unable to show "evidence that
there is a known or disclosed correlation between the combination of a
partial structure of a protein, the protein's biological activity, and the
protein's molecular weight, on the one hand, and the structure of the
DNA encoding the protein on the other." 8'
Miscellaneous Issues
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,3 the Federal Circuit held that a
patent holder may place restrictions on making, using, or selling second3 5 Monsanto Co. ("Monsanto") owns the
generation plant material."
patent-in-suit for genetically modified soybeans that are herbicideresistant 136 and sells the seed to farmers, including McFarling, under
a seasonal license that bars the farmers from re-using the second
generation seed or saving unused seed. McFarling used second
generation seeds and asserted that Monsanto's licensing scheme was
invalid for patent misuse on the allegation that the scheme extended the
patent right to "God-made soybean seed," i.e., the scheme was an
unlawful "tying"'13 7 agreement.13 8 The court rejected McFarling's
defense reasoning that Monsanto's scheme was not a tying agreement
because Monsanto was merely restricting the use of the second

H.

132. Id. at 1335 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
133.

Id.

134. 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135. Id. at 1343.
136. See id. at 1338.
Monsanto manufactures ROUNDUP@ herbicide, which contains glyphosate, a
chemical that indiscriminately kills vegetation by inhibiting the metabolic activity
of a particular enzyme, 5-enolpyruvyl-shikimate-3-phosphate synthase ("EPSPS").
EPSPS is necessary for the conversion of sugars . . . for growth-in many plants
and weeds. Monsanto also markets ROUNDUP READY® genetic-modification
technology,... [which] operates by inserting the gene sequence for a variant of
EPSPS that is not affected by the presence of glyphosate but that still performs
the sugar-conversion function required for cell growth. Thus, ROUNDUP READY®
soybean seeds ... can thus be sprayed [with ROUNDUP&I over the top of an
entire field killing the weeds without harming the ROUNDUP READY® soybeans.

Id.
137. A patent licensor who conditions the license on a patent licensee's purchase of an
unpatented material for use in the invention may, under certain conditions, be impermissibly extending the scope of the subject matter encompassed by the patent grant. Id. at
1341.

138. Id. at 1338-41.
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generation
plant material, which was also covered by the patents-in139
suit.
In National Steel Car, Ltd. v. CanadianPacific Railway, Ltd.,4° the
Federal Circuit interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 272141 for the first time and
held that the defendant foreign railroad, Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd.
("CPR"), was allowed to use its railcars temporarily in the United States
without creating any infringement.'
The railcars allegedly infringed
on a United States patent for an improvement in railcars owned by
National Steel Car, Ltd. The § 272 defense was available to CPR as long
as the use was "temporary," and the railcars were not sold in the United
States.'" The court defined temporary as a period of time of finite
duration with the sole purpose of engaging in international commerce.'
Because the railcar was only in the United
States to trans14
port goods, the § 272 defense was available to CPR. 1
In Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 146 the Federal Circuit held that
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 14 the main code section defining patent
infringement, "supplying" or "causing to be supplied" clearly refers to the
physical supply of components and not simply to the supply of instructions or corporate oversight.' 48 Thus, § 271(f) does not apply to items
that are not "made, used, sold, or offered for sale in the United

139. Id. at 1343.
140. 357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). Section 272 provides that the use of certain foreign-owned
means of transit or transport entering into the jurisdiction of the United States temporarily

or accidentally is not an infringing use provided certain conditions are met. This section
was drafted to codify the Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 183, 15 L. Ed. 595 (1856), and to satisfy the obligations of the United
States under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris
Convention"). See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 10 (1952) ("Section 272 is a new
section in the law relating to infringement, but it is of relatively little importance
and it follows a paragraph in a treaty to which the United States is a party."); S.
Rep. No. 82-1979, at 28 (1952) ("This section follows the requirement [in Article
5ter] of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to
which the United States is a party, and also codifies the holding of the Supreme
Court [in Brown] that use of a patented invention on board a foreign ship does not
infringe a patent.").
Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1326.
142. Nat'l Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1323-24.
143. Id. at 1329.
144. Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1331-32.
375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1115-17.
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States."149 It was undisputed that Analog Devices, Inc.'s ("Analog")
ADMC chips were manufactured exclusively outside of the United States
and that most of those chips were sold and shipped to customers outside
of the United States. Pellegrini argued that, even though United States
patent laws do not have extraterritorial effect, because Analog was
incorporated in the United States and has executive, marketing, and
product line responsibilities for ADMC products, Analog had extensive
contacts in the United States, which satisfied the "supplies" requirement
of§ 271(f) by evidencing acts of infringement occurring inside the United
States. 50 The court disagreed, holding that § 271(f) applies only when
components of a patent invention are physically present in the United
States and then either sold or exported "'in such a manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside the United States in
if such combination occurred
a manner that would infringe
' 151 the patent
within the United States.
In In re Klopfenstein,"5 the Federal Circuit held a reference that is
publicly accessible can count as a "printed publication" for purposes of
35 U.S.C. § 102(b)' 53 if it is shown for an extended period of time to a
segment of the public having ordinary skill in the art of the invention
and if the viewing segment of the public is not precluded from taking
The reference in this case was a poster
notes or photographs.'
displayed for approximately three cumulative days at two conferences to
those skilled in the art. There were no limitations on copying or
photographing the display.'5 5 Although no copies of the display were
disseminated to the public and its content was not indexed in any
database, catalog, or library, the public display at the conferences
satisfies the disclosure provisions of § 102.156
In Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Medical Products, Inc., "' the Federal
Circuit held that a reasonable apprehension of suit for patent infringement entitles a potential infringer the opportunity to seek declaratory
Dioptics Medical Products, Inc. ("Dioptics")
judgment relief. 5 8
produced "wear-over" sunglasses. Capo, Inc. ("Capo") was a wholesale
marketer of sunglasses and had also been a customer and reseller of

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1115-16.
Id. at 1117 (citation omitted).
380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1352.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1350.
387 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1357.
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Dioptics' products since 1988. Capo developed its own design of wearover sunglasses and was preparing to market this product in 2002.
Upon learning of Capo's plans, the president of Dioptics told Capo's
president that Dioptics had a large number of issued patents and
pending applications and that Dioptics vigorously enforces its patents
against infringers.'5 9 In addition, Dioptics's president left a voicemail
to Capo's president stating that if he did not hear from Capo's president
promptly, he would "presume that [Capo was] just ducking and racing
forward to infringement," and that Capo was "'charging down a path
here that's going to end up into a multi-million dollar lawsuit.'"'60
Capo filed a declaratory judgment complaint, seeking a declaration of
noninfringement on various Dioptics patents. 161 Dioptics moved for
dismissal of the declaratory action on the ground that Dioptics' president
could not have threatened suit for infringement because neither he nor
anyone else at Dioptics had seen Capo's "Suncovers" product, and no one
had analyzed it for infringement of any Dioptics patent. The district
court held that the dispute was not "sufficiently crystallized" for
declaratory action because (1) at the time the charges of infringement
were made by Dioptics's president, he had not seen Capo's product; (2)
Dioptics had not filed a compulsory counterclaim for infringement; and
(3) Dioptics stated that it had pending applications, not yet granted, that
better covered the accused product.' 62 The Federal Circuit noted that
while mere "jawboning" and aggressive negotiation does not always
establish a justiciable controversy, the district court clearly erred in
declining to find that Capo had a reasonable apprehension of suit (for
which a declaratory judgment is appropriate) because Dioptics's threats
were aimed at "impeding a competitor's commercial activity" and, thus,
resulted in a reasonable apprehension of suit. 6 '
III.

TRADEMARK CASES

Although precedent patent law cases for Georgia come from the
Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, federal case law
controlling Georgia for trademark law essentially comes from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme

159. Id. at 1353.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1354.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1356.
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Court.' r In this period, two interesting cases in the field of trademark
law were decided by the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court. 6 5
First, in KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 1
the United States Supreme Court held that a party raising the statutory
affirmative defense of fair use 6 to a claim of trademark infringement
does not have a burden to negate any likelihood of confusion.' 7 KP
Permanent Make-up, Inc., ("KP") and Lasting Impression I, Inc.
("Lasting") both use the term "micro color" (as one word or two, singular
or plural) in marketing permanent cosmetic makeup. In 1992 Lasting
registered a trademark that included the words "Micro Colors,"' and
in 1999, the registration became incontestable under the Lanham
Act. 6 9 After Lasting demanded that KP stop using the term, KP sued
for declaratory relief and asserted the statutory affirmative defense of
fair use.7 °
The Court held that the Lanham Act does not contemplate shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant asserting the fair use defense that there
Although the likelihood of
will be no likelihood of confusion.'
confusion was one consideration in determining whether the seller's use
was fair, a determination of some degree of likely confusion by itself did
not preclude the fair use defense. 7 ' In fact, the Court noted that the
owner of a descriptive mark "accepted that risk" when it decided to
identify its product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive
phrase.'7 3 Although the Court held that a defendant need not negate

164. While the Eleventh Circuit generally provides the case law controlling Georgia,
the Federal Circuit does pronounce the controlling case law in connection with registration
and cancellation of marks. Due to the space limitation of this Article, the trademark cases
from the Federal Circuit were omitted.
165. 125 S. Ct. 542 (2004).
166. "Fair use" is defined under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) as "use of the name, term, or
device. ... otherwise than as a mark in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
167. KP Make-up, 125 S. Ct. at 545-46. The test for trademark infringement includes
whether use of the allegedly infringing mark causes a likelihood of confusion with the
registered mark when each is used in connection with its respective goods or services. Id.
at 546.
168. Id. at 546.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2000 & Supp. 2002). Section 1065 provides that a trademark
registration can become incontestable after a certain period of registration and upon the
filing of a specific affidavit. Id.
170. KP Make-up, 125 S. Ct. at 546.
171. Id. at 548.
172. Id. at 550.
173. Id. (citing Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997)). See also Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189, 201 (1985) (noting safeguards in Lanham Act to prevent commercial monopolization
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a likelihood of confusion to prevail on the fair use defense, the Court
noted that the holding "does not foreclose the relevance of the extent of
any likely consumer confusion in assessing whether a defendant's use is
objectively fair."'74 This holding undoubtedly will make it more
difficult to enforce descriptive marks.
Second, in Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution,LLC, v5 the
Eleventh Circuit held that no trade dress 76 exists in an ice cream
design that is functional in nature.'7 7 Dippin' Dots, Inc. ("Dippin'
Dots") marketed and sold a "brightly-colored flash-frozen ice cream
product... [that] consist[ed] of free flowing small spheres or beads of ice
cream" using a logo made up of an oval of blue, yellow, and pink spheres
surrounding the product name in blue letters.7 8 Dippin' Dots sued
Frosty Bites Distribution, L.L.C. ("Frosty Bites") alleging trade dress
infringement in violation of the Lanham Act'79 for using the size,
shape, and color of the Dippin' Dots product. 8 '
The Eleventh Circuit was persuaded that the size, shape, and color of
the Dippin' Dots product was functional because the size and shape were
optimal with the patented method used to prepare the ice cream.''
Specifically, the court noted that tiny dots were needed with the
patented method of freezing the Dippin' Dots product to reduce the
formation of ice crystals.'8 2 The shape of the Dippin' Dots product was
determined to be functional because the bead shape of the Dippin' Dots
product was a direct result of the patent." 3 The court took judicial

of language); Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir.
1995).
174. KP Make-up, 125 S. Ct. at 550.
175. 369 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004).
176. "Trade dress" is generally a distinctive, nonfunctional feature, which distinguishes
a merchant's or manufacturer's goods or services from those of another and usually
involves the "total image," e.g., the color of the packaging, the configuration of goods, etc.
177. Dippin' Dots, 369 F.3d at 1206-07.
178. Id. at 1200.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000 & Supp. 2002). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states
that:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device ....
or any false designation
of origin, . . . which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation ....
of such person with another person, . . . shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.

Id.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Dippin' Dots, 369 F.3d at 1202-03.
Id. at 1203-06.
Id. at 1206.
Id.
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notice that the color of the Dippin' Dots product was functionally related
to flavor, despite Dippin' Dots' contrary argument.'"
Accordingly,
because the size, shape, and color of the Dippin' Dots product are
functionally related to the ice cream's taste and consistency, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Dippin' Dots did not have trade dress
properties in the Dippin' Dots product.'8 5
IV.

COPYRIGHT

During 2004 while other federal circuits throughout the United States
appeared to have been busy with copyright matters, the United States
Supreme Court did not hear any copyright cases and the Eleventh
Circuit heard only one copyright case.
Specifically, in Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc.,18 6 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction for the alleged conversion of ideas.'87 Dunlap conceived of
a federally chartered, Internet-based bank catering to the gay and
lesbian community. After the co-founders of this bank terminated his
employment, Dunlap sued the bank and the co-founders in state court
alleging that the co-founders converted Dunlap's idea and wrongfully
terminated his employment with the bank. The state actions were
removed to federal court because the case created a federal copyright
issue. 88
The Eleventh Circuit held that no substantial federal question was
presented to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction.8 9 The court
noted that "[t]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of
action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction."' 90

184. Id. at 1205.
THE COURT: - would you agree that I could take judicial notice that chocolate
ice cream is, generally speaking, brown, vanilla is white, strawberry is pink?
[COUNSEL]: I think you could do that, I think you could, sir, but I think it would
be appropriate to acknowledge that sometimes it's not. Chocolate can be white.
I mean, that's not an uncommon occurrence. Certainly with M&M's, chocolate
comes sometimes in a blue color. THE COURT: I'm just talking about ice cream.
[COUNSEL]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Ice cream is, generally speaking, chocolate
is brown, vanilla is white, and strawberry is pink. [COUNSEL]: That's correct,
sir, but it's not necessarily so.
Id.
185. Id. at 1206-07.
186. 381 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004).
187. Id. at 1297-98.
188. Id. at 1288-90.
189. Id. at 1290-91.
190. Id. at 1290 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813
(1986)).
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Because the United States Copyright Act' 9 ' protects expression of
ideas rather than the ideas themselves, Dunlap's idea for the bank was
not itself entitled to copyright protection. 92 More importantly, because
Dunlap's claim did not fall within the subject matter of copyright,
federal copyright pre-emption did not apply to confer jurisdiction. 193
As such, Dunlap's claim against the co-founders did not raise substantial
of federal law and the case was remanded back to state
questions
4
9

court.

V. FINAL NOTES
January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004 was an interesting, if not
overly active, period in the field of intellectual property. As expected,
the courts heard and decided cases interpreting some of the more
precedent-setting cases handed down over the previous few years.

191.
192.
193.
194.

17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
Dunlap, 381 F.3d at 1293-96.
Id. at 1294-96.
Id. at 1297-98.

